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Abstract
We analyze the IMF as a lender to countries in ﬁnancial distress highlighting the fact that it
is a senior creditor. An advantage of delegating senior lending in a single institution rather than
on competitive markets is that it would be able to reach the socially optimal solution. This would
require the IMF not to intervene when the crisis is severe enough. However, a commitment device
might be needed to achieve the socially optimal solution. If IMF lending were done for all shocks,
the country would be always ex-post better oﬀ but lenders would be worse oﬀ when the country
situation is either good or weak, which is consistent with empirical evidence. Anticipation of
senior lending might make the country better oﬀ by preventing ineﬃcient liquidation. However
it might actually hurt the country ex-ante and too much rescuing in the future could lead to
too little lending in the present which is contrary to the moral hazard critique.
JEL classiﬁcation: F30, F34, F40, E00.
Keywords: Seniority, Sovereign Debt, IMF, ex-ante, ex-post, welfare eﬀects.
∗E-mail address: dsaravia@faceapuc.cl . This paper is a modiﬁed version of the ﬁrst chapter of my PhD dissertation
at Maryland (2004). I am grateful to Fernando Broner, Guillermo Calvo, Enrique Mendoza, Michael Pries, Carmen
Reinhart and John Shea for discussions and suggestions. I have also beneﬁted from comments by Eduardo Ganapolsky,
Pedro Rodriguez and seminar participants at the Bank of England, Columbia University, IDB, Latin American
Econometric Society, Royal Economic Society Annual Meetings (2006), University of Guelph, UC Riverside and the
University of Maryland.1 Introduction
The role that the IMF should play in the International Financial Architecture and the eﬀects of
its interventions are important issues in the policy and academic debate, especially after the crisis
that hit emerging market economies in the recent past beginning with Mexico in 1994. Arguably,
the IMF has some special characteristics that make it a special player in international ﬁnancial
markets. Some argue that it may have more information than other lenders (e.g. Rodrik 1995) and
that could be used by other lenders as a screening device (Marchesi and Thomas (1999)). Others
claim that the IMF could act as a delegated monitor through its conditionality and surveillance
functions and serves as a countrys commitment device to behave well (e.g. Tirole (2002)). Others
highlight the the role of the IMF as a liquidity provider to countries in ﬁnancial distress or as an
International Lender of Last Resort (e.g. Rogoﬀ (1999) and Fisher (1999)). There is no consensus
about the relevance of these characteristics, the way they aﬀect capital ﬂows to a country and how
they help countries overcome ﬁnancial crisis.
This paper also focus on the role of the IMF as providing liquidity to countries in ﬁnancial
distress but focusing on another aspect of IMF lending speciﬁcally its status as senior lender.
The IMF is a de facto preferred creditor. Countries have shown a higher aversion to default
on IMF loans than on loans form private creditors. Using Eichengreen (2003) words “The IMF
typically gets paid back (instances of arrears to IMF loans are the exception to the rule).” Several
commentators rationalize this preferred creditor status arguing that it allows the IMF to provide
funds to countries in ﬁnancial distress when other lenders are not willing to lend and countries
respect this status because they know that they would need IMF assistance in the future.1 In
turn, it is also argued, that the lower rates on IMF loans respond to its senior status. In principle,
countries could assign this de facto preferred creditor status to other types of lenders. However,
it is argued, that this status relies on the IMF because it is a big and identiﬁable creditor. The
preferred creditor status of the IMF relies on the belief that it is better to maintain a relationship
with the IMF because of its willingness in the future to provide emergency assistance, than it is
with other lenders. 2
In this paper we analyze how the introduction of this fact in the analysis aﬀects the way that
1The argument is similar to the argument of giving seniority to new money in case of bankruptcy.
2See, for example, Roubini and Sester (2004), for a detailed discussion on these issues
1IMF lending interacts with private capital ﬂows and how it aﬀects countries and other lenders
welfare. We conduct the analysis comparing a situation where senior lending is allowed with one
where lending is left to atomistic lenders acting in competitive markets. We do this from an ex-post
point of view, i.e. once initial lending decisions have been taken and from an ex-ante point of view,
i.e. when the initial lending decisions are taken.
The presence of senior lending may introduce a conﬂict of interest between the country and
non-senior lenders. Since a senior lender has a greater probability of being repaid, it will be able
to lend in a crisis where other non-senior lenders are not willing to do so because of debt overhang
and credit ceiling considerations. This would allow the economy to overcome the crisis but it may
aﬀect negatively non-senior lenders that see their debts diluted. In turn, private non-senior lenders
would take into account these opposing forces of future senior interventions when making their
initial loans to a country.
Since we are interested in the seniority issue, we will study the IMF as a deep-pocket investor
with seniority rights that chooses to make zero proﬁts in expectation despite its monopolistic
situation; which, arguably, is a reasonable assumption about IMF lending. The relevant distinction
in the model is, therefore, between senior and non-senior lending. As noted above this senior lending
could also be interpreted as done by private lenders. However, the interpretation of the IMF as the
senior lender is supported by the de facto seniority observed in the real world.
The paper presents a model with three periods: a planning period, a period when a shock
hits the economy and a ﬁnal period where a random level of output is obtained and consumption
and debt repayment take place. In the planning period, the country borrows from international
markets to invest in capital, which is used in the production process in order to maximize expected
utility. In the middle period the country has already installed the capital and potentially has to
borrow new money to cope with a liquidity shock. When the liquidity shock is high enough non-
senior lenders would expect losses on new loans and, assuming that they are atomistic and cannot
coordinate eﬀorts to make “emergency loans” to protect initial claims, they will not be able to lend;
in contrast, senior lenders would make nonnegative proﬁts for a higher range of shocks since they
have priority in case of default. If the economy is able to cope with the shock, a random level of
output is obtained in the ﬁnal period and if it were not able to do it, the country cannot continue
with the project and has to default on its debts at that moment.
2Borrowers are always ex-post better oﬀ if senior lending were available because it is always in
their interests to cope with the shock and a senior lender lends at a lower interest rate than other
lenders. However, the eﬀects of senior lending on other existing lenders depend on the size of the
shock and what they expect to get if the country were not able to cope with it (a scrap value in
the model). When the shock is small enough such that non-senior lending is available a senior
intervention makes existing lenders worse oﬀ independently of the scrap value since continuation
occurs anyway but senior lending dilutes their debts. When the shock is high enough such that
non-senior lending is not available, existing lenders would be worse-oﬀ with senior lending if the
scrap value is high enough. The reason is that they would prefer liquidation rather than seeing
their debts diluted. On the other hand, when the scrap value is not too high, existing lenders would
prefer a senior intervention if the shock is not too high. The reason is that they prefer continuation
although their debts are diluted. When the shock becomes high enough existing lenders prefer
liquidation rather than seeing their debts diluted.3
In the planning period, lenders are aware of the nature, senior or non-senior, of future lending
and take this into account when making their pricing decisions in that period. When the scrap
value is small, continuation of the project is socially optimal. However, when the scrap value is high
enough liquidation is optimal when the shock is also high enough. In this case, a social planner
willing to maximize borrowers’ welfare ex-ante will allow liquidation to obtain the scrap value.
This solution could be obtained if senior lending were available only it is socially optimal to
continue with the project. Since senior lending make nonnegative expected proﬁts in the crisis
period, this would imply that senior lending would not be available in cases when it is proﬁtable
to do it. This might be a reason why it is optimal to delegate senior lending in a single institution
rather than in atomistic lenders acting in competitive markets. It is likely that these ones would
lend automatically in the crisis period as long as they do not expect losses in their lending; while,
it is more likely that a single lender would be able to discern about whether to lend in a given
situation. However, even in this case there might be incentives to lend once the shock occurs.
The reason is that it might be a dynamic inconsistency problem since there is a potential conﬂict
between ex-ante and ex-post borrowers’ interests. Suppose senior lending is realized to maximize
borrower welfare. Although it might be optimal ex-ante not to allow senior lending in the future for
3When the scrap value is an intermediate range, the prediction of the model is consistent with empirical evidence
presented in Mody and Saravia (2006).
3high shocks, it is always in borrowers interests to continue ex-post. Thus, once capital is installed
and the initial lending decisions have been taken there would be incentives to borrow from senior
lender(s) to continue for all sizes of the shock. A senior lender willing to maximize borrowers’
welfare would need a commitment device to maintain the optimal policy from an ex-ante point
of view. Without this commitment device, lenders in the planning period would expect senior
interventions in the future and would price this in their initial loans making the country ex-ante
worse oﬀ. Of course this tension does not exist when senior lending is optimal also from an ex-ante
point of view.
Thus, the potential distortion that senior lending introduces is that it would allow for over-
continuation of the projects. As shown in the paper this would imply that there would be less
lending in the planning period when a senior intervention is expected in the future. This is contrary
to the standard moral hazard critique that says that too much rescuing in the future would lead
to too much lending in the present. Here too much rescuing in the future could lead to too little
lending in the present.
In the paper we recognize that the ﬁrst best outcome could be reached with senior lending;
however, for the reasons given above, we analyze the case where senior lending occurs for all sizes
of the shock and compare the eﬀects of this potentially suboptimal policy with one where lenders
are non-senior. In fact, some argue that there were cases in which the IMF has intervened too much
in a country. In the case of Argentina, for example, anecdotal evidence suggests that even private
lenders at some point preferred the IMF to stop lending, making the country face the “unavoidable”
debt crisis. For example, when referring to the Argentine crisis, a ﬁnancial industry oﬃcial said
that members of the lending community have told Argentine and IMF authorities:
“The game is up you need a broad-based restructuring that involves a reduction in the value of
our claim” (Blunstein (2005) pp. 163)
Next subsection relates this work to the literature. Section 2 describes the elements of the
model. Section 3 solves the model backwards. We compare a situation where senior lending is
not allowed, and creditors have equal sharing in case of default, with one where it is. Analyzing
period 1, when capital is installed and the shock hits the economy, we will examine ex-post eﬀects
of senior intervention on the country and private creditors’ welfare. In period 0, when borrowing
and lending decisions are made, we study how the possibility of a senior intervention aﬀects the
4initial level of investment and the country’s welfare ex-ante. Section 4 concludes.
1.1 Relation to the Literature
The paper contributes to the discussion about the role of the IMF as an International Lender of
Last Resort (ILOLR). 4 On the one hand, some have defended the intervention of the IMF as a
LOLR (e.g. Fischer (1999)). On the other, some are more skeptical about its ability to perform
this role (e.g. Rogoﬀ (1999), Calomiris (1998)). An important point in this debate is the tradeoﬀ
between ex-ante moral hazard and ex-post eﬃciency. Some argue that having an ILOLR institution
able to ﬁll liquidity needs reduces the probability of crisis and ameliorates their eﬀects once they
occur. Other claims that an ILOLR would trigger debtor and other creditors’ moral hazard, because
knowing that there will be a future bailout would make them take riskier strategies. Our model
abstracts from coordination and moral hazard issues and adds to the literature by considering the
nature of senior lender of the ILOLR. In our context, although the IMF might allow the country
to cope with the crisis improving its situation ex-post, it might hurt other lenders if it lends when
it is not socially optimal to do it causing, in this case, over-continuation of the project. The IMF
would be able to reach the ﬁrst best solution, although this might mean not lending when the
crisis is severe. However this solution might not be reached because of the conﬂict between ex-post
and ex-ante incentives and the expectation of future interventions might lead to a lower level of
borrowing in the present. Thus too much rescuing in the future would lead to too little borrowing
in the present which is contrary to the standard moral hazard critique.
Recent theoretical work by Corsetti et al. (2003) studies the role of the IMF in catalyzing
capital ﬂows by providing liquidity in a model with coordination problems between creditors having
asymmetric information about the state of the economy.5 In one of the extensions to their model,
they consider the case where the IMF is a senior lender. They conclude that since a senior lender is
more willing to intervene, the probability of a crisis would be reduced, but since the return to junior
lenders is lower they would be less willing to roll over their debts. As noted above, in our paper,
we are not concerned with coordination problems and roll-over of short term debt issues although
4See Roubini and Sester (2004) for a summary of the literature on this issue.
5Morris and Shin (2003) use a similar analysis to Corsetti et.al. to analyze the IMF’s ability to catalyze capital
ﬂows. Penalver (2004) reaches similar conclusions to Morris and Shin’s work with a diﬀerent modeling strategy. None
of these works analyzes the role of IMF seniority.
5we recognize they are important. Rather, our framework allows us to analyze the impact of senior
interventions on borrowers’ and lenders’ ex-ante and ex-post welfare, highlighting the conﬂict of
interest between borrowers and lenders that a senior intervention may imply.
The issue of seniority was more studied in the corporate ﬁnance literature than in the context of
sovereign debt. In an early contribution, Fama and Miller (1972) recognize that lenders can protect
themselves from future dilution of their debts by issuing senior debt. Generally, the objective of
these works is to explain the observed capital structure of the ﬁrm and derive the optimal one. For
example Diamond (1993), in a context of asymmetric information about borrower’s type, argues
that short-term debt would be senior to long-term debt. In his model issuing senior short term
debt increases the sensitivity costs to new information for a given control rent and would be the
contract that the best type chooses. Hart and Moore (1995) argue that long term senior debt is
useful to constrain management from “empire building” investment (overinvestment). Berkovitch
and Kim (1990) also argue that allowing for senior lending may cause over investment. In our model
allowing for a senior intervention may cause continuation of the project when it is socially optimal
to liquidate ex-post. However, the level of investment may be lower ex-ante. Detriagache (1994)
highlights the fact that seniority clauses are not used in sovereign debt. She argues that this lack of
seniority clauses (and the presence of equal-sharing) leads to excessive borrowing. In our paper we
compare two scenarios, one where senior lending is allowed with one where all lenders have equal
sharing. As mentioned above, in our context, equal-sharing would lead to less borrowing ex-post,
although it may be higher ex-ante, than when senior lending is allowed. Dolley (2000) argues that
countries optimally choose debt instruments that are diﬃcult to restructure in order to maintain
the punishment necessary to avoid strategic default. This would imply that International Financial
Institutions would not have to intervene in crisis; otherwise, initial lending would not be possible
in the ﬁrst place. We obtain that in some cases the IMF should abstain from lending if it were
interested in maximizing countries’ ex-ante welfare. However, our reasons and circumstances are
diﬀerent. In a recent contribution Bolton and Jeanne (2005) study the eﬀects of debt dilution in
choosing the optimal structure of sovereign debt. They argue that, in equilibrium, countries would
issue debt that is diﬃcult to restructure in order to avoid future dilution. In this paper we also
have, in a diﬀerent context, debt dilution when allowing for senior interventions. Both papers diﬀer
in motivation, framework and conclusions.
62 Model
Time. There are three periods, indexed by t=0,1,2. In period 0, agents make real investment and
borrowing decisions. In period 1, the economy can be hit by a shock that aﬀects the production
process. In order to cope with this shock, agents have to borrow again. In period 2, output is
realized, debt issued in period 0 and 1 is repaid and consumption takes place.
Agents and production. The economy is populated by a continuum of identical consumer-
producers with linear preferences over consumption of a single good at date 2; i.e their utility
function is U(c0,c1,c2) = c2. The production process has a time-to-build aspect: investment is
realized in period 0 and 1 and output is realized in period 2. It is assumed that agents do not have
any endowment of goods in period 0 and 1, so they have to borrow from abroad in order to import
goods used as inputs in the production process. In period 0, agents borrow to install capital, k0,
which will be depreciated totally at the end of period 2.
To avoid borrower’s moral hazard considerations, we assume that investment is veriﬁable, or
alternatively, that there is no storage technology available, so that the amount borrowed has to be
invested in the production process.
Following Holmstrom and Tirole (1998) and Caballero and Krishnamurthy (2001) we introduce
a liquidity shock in period 1 as a production shock that the economy has to cope with by borrowing
additional funds.
Let ρ be the aggregate liquidity shock that hits the economy in period 1. Agents will need a
reinvestment of ρk0 to continue the project. If they do not reinvest this amount, then the project
cannot continue and a scrap value, S(k0), is obtained in period 2. S is assumed to be quasiconcave,
increasing in k0 and satisﬁes S ≤ k0. 6
Assume ρ is a random variable distributed between [0,1] with cumulative distribution function
G(ρ). In order to introduce market incompleteness, we assume that ρ is observable but not ver-
iﬁable, so that contracts in period 0 cannot be made contingent on realized values of the shock
in period 1.7 We do not consider idiosyncratic shocks since we are interested in cases in which
the economy as a whole needs liquidity, and we are not concerned with heterogeneity between
6The scrap value could be interpreted as what lenders expect to get if the country is not able to overcome the
crisis; for example, what they expect to get in a debt restructuring process.
7This assumption prevents countries signing insurance contracts (or pool liquidity risk) in period 0.
7residents.8
If reinvestment is made in period 1, then the project continues and output in period 2 is λf(k0),
where λ is a random productivity shock distributed between [0, ¯ λ] with cumulative distribution
F(λ), and where f(k0) is a concave function. It is assumed that E(λ)f(k0) > k0; otherwise,
investors will not invest in period 0. So, the model presents two kind of shocks; ρ is needed to
introduce the demand for liquidity and λ is introduced to allow for the possibility of default that,
as will be explained later, is needed for the relevance of the seniority issue.
period 0 period 1 period 2













λ ∼ F[0, ¯ λ]
Financial contracts. As noted above, residents have to borrow from abroad in order to produce.
This is an ability-to-pay model with no deadweight losses associated with bankruptcy. That is,
when realized output is lower than debt face value or when the project is discontinued, lenders can
seize output or the scrap value.
It is assumed that debt issued in period 0 and debt issued in period 1 both mature in period
2. International lenders are risk neutral, act in a competitive environment and have enough wealth
to provide liquidity to the country when needed. Clearly, for any amount lent they will charge a
positive interest rate since the default risk is positive (remember that the minimum value that λ
can take is zero).
Without loss of generality, it is assumed that the gross international interest rate is equal to 1.
At date 0 domestic agents borrow an amount L0 (equal to k0) and agree to pay a total amount of
D0 (i.e. initial amount borrowed plus interest) in period 2. At date 1 they borrow an amount L1
(equal to ρk0) whose face value in period 2 is D1.
8The assumption that the liquidity shock has to be reinvested rules out the possibility that new lending done to
cope with the shock is used for other purposes, like paying existing lenders which is, according to some commentators,
a possibility with IMF funds.
83 Equilibrium
In what follows we will solve the model backwards beginning with period 2. In period 1, when the
shock hits, we will consider what happens when senior lending is allowed in that period. Then we
will consider period 0.
3.1 Period 2
In period 2, if reinvestment has been made in period 1, output is realized, debt is repaid, and
consumption takes place. Consumption will be greater than zero if and only if output is greater
than the total face value of debt contracted in period 0 (D0) and in period 1 (D1), which occurs
when:






Thus, total debt will be repaid and consumption will be positive if and only if the productivity
shock is higher than a threshold value λ∗.
Assumption 1. In case of default (i.e. λ < λ∗) the proportion of output that goes to each creditor
equals the share of his loan in total loans, i.e Li
Li+L−i.
That is, absent seniority, creditors have equal footing on output in case of bankruptcy. In the
real world most sovereign debt restructuring are complicated processes with special characteristics
of their own. However, although their interpretation and eﬀectiveness is somewhat controversial,
sovereign debt instruments usually have pari-passu clauses to avoid discrimination against them
and to prevent their dilution in the event of default (see for example the Financial Market Law
Committee (2005)). Also, when doing their restructuring proposals, many countries claim that
they are based in the principle of equal treatment between private debt instruments.
The assumption that partial repayment in case of default is done without considering the interest
rate is important for the analysis. We have not assumed that output is divided using the loan plus
interests, i.e. Di
Di+D−i, because new lenders would dilute more heavily existing debt for high shocks
9and could become eﬀectively senior.9 In the context of our model this would imply that borrowers
would always ﬁnd fresh founds to cope with the shock by oﬀering an interest rate that is high
enough in detriment of existing lenders. This is because borrowers always want to continue for all
sizes of the shock and, consequently, they would have incentives to oﬀer an interest rate high enough
to dilute existing lenders’ debt. Argentina constitutes a real world example where the total amount
of interests accrued were not taken into account to determine the eligible debt to be restructured.10
Under the assumption we use in the paper, there is also dilution of existing debt. The higher
is the shock in period 1 the higher is the dilution of period 0 debt. However, this dilution is less
severe than in the case where interests are taken into account to make the partial payments in case
of default.
Since Li
Li+L−i need not be the same as Di
Di+D−i, it is possible that the output due to a creditor in
case of default is higher than his debt face value. To rule this out, assume:
Assumption 2. In case of default, if Li
Li+L−iλf(k0) is greater than Di then lender i gets Di.
Thus, a creditor’s repayment in period 2 will be the maximum of his contractual value of debt
and his share of output under the equal footing scheme.
If reinvestment has not taken place in period 1, the scrap value of the project, S(k0), is divided
between creditors, and consumption is equal to zero (remember that by assumption S(k0) < k0
and, consequently, S(k0) < D0).
3.2 Period 1
At the beginning of this period the random variable ρ is observed, there is installed capital (k0),
and the economy inherits a stock of debt contracted in period 0 (D0). Agents need to borrow ρk0 in
order to continue the project. Since it is assumed that if reinvestment is not made the project ends
and consumption is zero, the borrower country will always want to reinvest as long as the highest
possible output level is higher than the total value of debt. So the demand for loans is determined
by the size of the shock.
9This ratio converges to one when the interest rate, and thus Di converges to inﬁnity.
10Argentina defaulted on December of 2001. It was not until January of 2005 that the oﬀer of new instruments
opened. The eligible debt would include the interest accrued and not paid until December of 2001 (see the Exchange
Oﬀer presentation on January 12th 2005. Available at www.argentinedebtinfo.gov.ar)
103.2.1 Supply of loans under equal footing
As noted above, international capital markets are competitive and the international gross interest
rate is equal to 1. Competition between lenders will ensure that expected proﬁts from lending to
the country will be zero.
Deﬁne λ1 as the threshold productivity level above which period 1 lenders’ output share, com-


















Similarly, deﬁne λ0 as the threshold value above which period 0 lenders’ output share is greater
than D0:




















λ0 = λ∗, so that the threshold productivity shock above which all
debts are repaid (λ∗) is a weighted average of λ1 and λ0. When λ1 is lower than λ∗, it means that
D1 is totally repaid when the productivity shock is at least λ1; for productivity shocks between λ1
and λ∗, D0 holders get output in excess of D1; and when the productivity shock is higher than λ∗,
output is enough to repay both D0 and D1. A comparable analysis holds when λ0 is lower than λ∗.
Also, note that λ0 will be higher than λ1 if and only if the interest rate charged on period 0 loans is
higher than the interest rate charged in period 1; both interest rates are determined in equilibrium
below.















The right hand side is period 1 lenders’ expected repayment from investing in the country and


























where r1 = D1
ρk0 is the gross interest rate charged to the country by international lenders.
Lemma 1. The interest rate r1 is increasing in the amount lent.
Proof in the appendix.
So, the higher period 1 shock is, i.e. the higher the amount needed to continue the project, the
more expensive, per dollar, it will be for the borrower to continue.
Proposition 1. There is a set of liquidity shocks suﬃciently close to 1 for which no credit is


















dF(λ) < 1, (5)
Proof. A necessary and suﬃcient condition to have lending in period 1 that satisﬁes the zero















This is because, given the loan size (ρk0) and the value of debt issued in period 0 (D0), period 1
lenders’ expected repayment is increasing in D1; and the right hand side of (6) is lenders’ expected
repayment when the value of D1 is high enough that total debt (D1+D0) is greater than or equal to
the highest possible repayment (¯ λf(k0)).11 If condition (6) is not satisﬁed then period 1 creditors
will expect losses on any loan of size ρk0. The set of values for ρ satisfying (6) is not empty. The




k0 dF(λ) is greater than one.
11If D1 + D0 > ¯ λf(k0), then λ
∗ > ¯ λ and λ
1 > ¯ λ. Thus, the left hand side of (6) follows from replacing λ
∗ by ¯ λ in
the left hand side of (4), taking into account that the third term vanishes.
12Since the ﬁrst term of the right hand side of (6) is a continuous, increasing and concave function
of ρ and the second term is continuous and decreasing in ρ, a necessary and suﬃcient condition to
have a range of liquidity shocks where expected proﬁts are negative is that (6) is not satisﬁed when
ρ is equal to one. So, if condition (5) holds, there will be a threshold value of ρ strictly less than
one above which expected proﬁts to lenders are negative. Since the expected repayment function is
increasing and continuous in D1, there will be a value of D1 such that expected repayment equals
the loan size.
















such that for ρ > ˆ ρ there will be no lending under equal footing. A suﬃcient condition to have
ˆ ρ < 1 is that (5) is true even in the case where D0 is equal to k0, which is the lowest possible
interest rate on period 0 debt and thus the case most likely to favor lending in period 1. Therefore,















Note that it may be in the interest of period 0 lenders, as a group, to lend in period 1 at an
expected loss in order to protect their initial claims. However, any individual lender will be better
oﬀ if the other lenders provide liquidity allowing the project to continue. That is, there is a conﬂict
between private and collective interests; each period 0 lender has incentive to ‘free-ride’.12 The lack
of coordination between creditors is a characteristic of actual sovereign debt markets and the way
to overcome the free-rider problem is an important unresolved issue in current policy and academic
debate.13
Clearly, creditors that have not lent in period 0 do not have any incentive to lend at an expected
12This free rider problem has been acknowledged and discussed in the sovereign debt literature; see for example
Krugman (1988) and Eichengreen (2002).
13In a recent speech Anne Krueger states: “...These far-reaching developments in capital markets over the last three
decades have not been matched by the development of an orderly and predictable framework for creditor coordination.
Because the creditor community is increasingly diverse and diﬀuse, coordination and collective action problems result
when scheduled debt service exceeds a country’s ability to pay” (see IMF survey April 2000).
13loss in period 1. In this paper we assume that lenders are atomistic, act in a purely competitive
market and cannot coordinate actions to pursue their collective interests (i.e. the free-rider issue
is severe).14
3.2.2 Senior Lending allowed in period 1
Consider the case where senior lending is allowed in credit markets in period 1. The concept of
seniority is relevant when contractual obligations cannot be totally satisﬁed; i.e. in the case of
default. If this is not the case, there is no conﬂict of interest between creditors and the concept of
seniority is not important. As noted above, in this model, we can think of this senior lending as
done by competitive markets or as done by a single senior lender (such as the IMF) that chooses to
make zero proﬁts in expectation despite its monopolistic situation which is, arguably, a reasonable
assumption about IMF lending. Also, as mentioned in the introduction, the interpretation of the
IMF as the senior lender is supported by the de facto seniority that has historically shown over
other types of sovereign debt instruments.
Since senior creditors have priority on output in case of default, they do not have to consider
the stock of existing debt when making their own lending decisions.
Lemma 2. Senior lenders do not expect negative proﬁts for any loan in period 1.
Proof: The maximum payment that senior lenders could get is E(λ)f(k0), which is greater than
ρk0, for all ρ, by previous assumption.
Thus, senior lending would be available in more states of nature than non-senior lending. If the
only criteria used by senior lenders to make their loans in period 1 is the nonnegativity of their
expected proﬁts, they would lend for all sizes of the liquidity shock. As will be noted below when
discussing the period-0 decisions, if senior lending is done in order to maximize expected utility
ex-ante it would not be realized when the liquidity shock in period 1 and scrap values are high
enough.
In the rest of this section we analyze how senior lending done to cope with a given sized shock in
period 1 aﬀects borrowers and period-0 lenders’ situation once the initial borrowing and investment
decisions have been taken (i.e. ex-post).
14If we had assumed that period 0 lenders act in their interest as a group, then they might want to lend when the
shock is so big that lending under equal footing is at a loss and continue with the project.
14Let Ds
1 be the value of debt owed to a senior creditor; the threshold productivity shock above






If the productivity shock is lower than this threshold value, senior creditors will not be totally repaid










1dF(λ) = 1, (9)
where Ls
1 and rs
1 are the amount lent by a senior creditor and the interest rate charged, respectively.
The interest rate charged by a senior lender will not be the same as that charged by a non-senior
one. In particular:
Lemma 3. For a given sized loan, the interest rate charged by a senior lender is lower than that
charged by a lender without seniority rights.
Proof in the appendix.
This result implies that total expected consumption in period 2 is higher when a senior lender in-
tervenes and, consequently, the country is ex-post (i.e. conditional on k0) better oﬀ under seniority.
Obviously, borrowers prefer to pay less for a given amount lent.
At the beginning of period 1 there is a stock of debt issued in period 0 (D0) that matures in
period 2. The period 1 value of this stock of debt will be aﬀected by the size of the liquidity shock
and by the nature (senior or non-senior) of period 1 lenders.
To see the impact of a senior intervention on the period 0 lenders’ position, we have to consider
whether the liquidity shock is greater or less than ˆ ρ, the threshold value above which non-senior
creditors are unwilling to lend.
Consider ﬁrst the case when ρ < ˆ ρ. In this situation non-senior lenders are willing to lend to
the borrower country and a senior intervention will make period 0 lenders worse oﬀ. To see why
this is the case note that output is divided in period 2 between the country, period 0 and period
1 creditors. At the beginning of period 1, the expected value of output is given, since with ρ < ˆ ρ
the project will continue whether period 1 lenders are senior or not. Meanwhile period 1 lenders,
15independent of their seniority rights, set the price of the new debt (r1 or rs
1) so that expected
repayments in period 2 are equal to the size of the loan (ρk0), by the zero proﬁt condition.
Since expected output and expected repayment to period 1 lenders are the same with and
without senior lending, but expected consumption is higher in the ﬁrst case, it must be the case
that period 0 lenders’ expected repayment (or, equivalently, the period 1 value of their claims) is
lower under a senior intervention. A senior lender does not add value when the country is able to
ﬁnance the liquidity shock using non-senior sources, but instead merely transfers resources from
period 0 debt holders to the country. So, a senior intervention when ρ < ˆ ρ reduces the period 1
price of the debt issued in period 0.
Consider now the case where ρ > ˆ ρ. In this case, the only way to ﬁnance the liquidity shock is
by issuing senior debt.
To see how senior lending aﬀects existing creditors in this situation, we compare the period 1
value of existing debt with and without seniority. When senior lending is not allowed, the project
is canceled and the scrap value is obtained. Since this is an ability-to-pay model, period 0 lenders
get the entire scrap value (remember that we have assumed that the scrap value is less than k0).
Let V n be the period 1 value of D0 when there is no reﬁnancing, that is:
V n(k0) = S(k0)





















The period 1 value of debt issued in period 0 is equal to the face value (D0) times the probability
of being fully repaid, which occurs when the productivity shock is higher than the threshold value
λB, plus what existing creditors expect to get when output is not enough to cover total contractual
16obligations. When the productivity shock is between λs and λB output is enough to cover senior
debt in full but covers only part of non-senior debt. When the shock is less than λs, output is not
enough to cover senior debt, and non-senior creditors get nothing.
Deﬁne the function ψ (S,ρ) as the diﬀerence between the period 1 value of debt when a senior
intervention is allowed and when it is not:
ψ (S,ρ) ≡ V s − V n.
That is, positive values of ψ imply that period 0 lenders are better oﬀ with a senior intervention.
ψ is a function of the liquidity shock and of the scrap value, since both parameters aﬀect the













= −1 < 0.
Thus, ψ (S,ρ) is a decreasing function in both arguments.
Note that when there is no scrap value (i.e. S = 0), ψ (0,ρ) is greater than zero for all values of
ρ. This is because cancelation leaves existing creditors with zero, while continuation leaves existing
creditors with strictly positive expected returns.16 Also note that if the scrap value were equal to
D0, ψ (D0,ρ) is strictly negative for all values of ρ since cancellation gives period 0 debt holders the
full value of debt with certainty, while a senior intervention reduces the probability of repayment
below one.
Since ψ(S,ρ) is a continuous and decreasing function in both arguments, and since ψ (0,ρ) >
0 ∀ρ and ψ (D0,ρ) < 0 ∀ρ, there is for each ρ a unique value of S, denoted by S0(ρ), where
ψ(S,ρ) = 0. The higher the liquidity shock, the lower the value of S0. We can express this in the
following ﬁgure:
15The terms derived from the diﬀerentiation of the integration limits cancel each other out.
16The only case when period 0 debt holders expect to get nothing in case of continuation is when D
s
1 is equal to
¯ λf(k0); but in this case senior lenders’ expected proﬁts will be strictly positive (since k0 is lower than E(λ)f(k0))
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S0(1) S0(ˆ ρ) D0 S
ψ(S, ¯ ρ)
0
Thus, existing creditors’ view of senior intervention depends on the size of the liquidity shock
and the project’s scrap value. We can distinguish three situations. First, when the scrap value is
lower than S0(1), a senior intervention will raise the value of existing debt for all ρ > ˆ ρ. In this
case, the value of liquidation is so low that even in the worst possible scenario (highest senior debt)
period 0 lenders prefer to continue the projects.
Second, when the scrap value is between S0(1) and S0(ˆ ρ) there is a set of liquidity shocks in
the vicinity of 1 where a senior intervention makes period 0 debt holders worse oﬀ. Moreover,
there is a set of liquidity shocks close enough (from the right) to ˆ ρ where a senior intervention
makes period 0 debt holders better oﬀ. So, in this zone seniority has ambiguous eﬀects on existing
creditors depending on the size of the liquidity shock. In particular, there is a nonlinear eﬀect of
senior intervention on the price of the debt issued in period 0. When the shock is small (ρ < ˆ ρ)
a senior intervention reduces this price (i.e. increases spreads over the international interest rate);
when the shock is not too far above ˆ ρ, a senior intervention increases this price; and when the shock
is close to 1 the price is reduced by senior intervention again. This eﬀect is consistent with the
empirical evidence in Mody and Saravia (2006) where they show that IMF interventions increase
spreads when countries’ solvency and liquidity situation is either good or weak and reduce spreads
18when it is in an intermediate range.17, 18
Finally, when the scrap value is higher than S0(ˆ ρ), a senior intervention always makes period
0 debt holders worse oﬀ. Because the scrap value is so high, initial lenders prefer to get that value
for sure rather than continuing the project and taking the risk of not being repaid.
We can summarize the ﬁndings of this section in the following proposition:
Proposition 2. Conditional on k0 a senior intervention will improve debtors’ situation in all cases
since it allows a higher level of consumption. The eﬀect on period 0 debt holders depends on ρ and
S:
• If ρ < ˆ ρ a senior intervention will always make existing creditors worse oﬀ.
• If ρ > ˆ ρ we have three possible scenarios:
1. If S < S0(1) senior lending makes existing creditors better oﬀ for all values of ρ.
2. If S0(1) < S < S0(ˆ ρ) existing creditors’ situation will improve if ρ is close enough to ˆ ρ
and will be worsened if ρ is close enough to 1.
3. If S0(ˆ ρ) < S senior lending always makes existing creditors worse oﬀ.
That is, senior lending may aﬀect borrowers and lenders diﬀerently; in some cases, it will allow
for the continuation of projects when existing creditors would prefer to liquidate them. In these
cases, there is a conﬂict of interest between the borrower and existing lenders since the former is
always willing to ﬁnish the project.
3.3 Period 0
Period 0 is the planning period. Borrowers decide how much to invest and borrow in order to
maximize their expected utility (expected consumption in period 2), and lenders set the price of
their loans in order to attain zero expected proﬁts.
In period 0 individuals have uncertainty about two shocks: the liquidity shock (ρ) and the
productivity shock (λ). That is, expectations have to be taken over two random variables. We
consider the case where all agents have perfect foresight about the nature of future interventions.
17In this model, since the international gross interest rate is one, spreads in period 1 are equal to the ratio between
the contractual value of debt issued in period 0 (D0) and its market value in period 1 (V
s or V
n).
18The higher is the liquidity shock the worse is the solvency situation.
19That is, borrowers and lenders take their decisions knowing whether interventions in period 1 will
be senior or equal footing.
3.3.1 Equal footing in period 1
Agents make their decisions taking into account that if the liquidity shock in period 1 is high enough
the project will have to be discontinued and there will be no consumption and only partial debt
repayment.
In equilibrium, borrowers in period 0 decide the amount they want to borrow in order to
maximize their expected utility, taking into account how their decisions aﬀect the credit conditions















































V0 is borrowers’ expected utility, and λ∗ ,λ1 and λ0 are as deﬁned above in (1),(2) and (3) re-
spectively. The outer integral of (11) corresponds to expectations taken over the liquidity shock,
recognizing that if ρ > ˆ ρ(k0) consumption is zero under equal footing. The inner integral cor-
responds to expectations taken over the productivity shock, knowing that consumption will be
positive if output is enough to cover the total value of debt contracted in period 0 and in period 1.
That is, consumption will be positive if and only if ρ > ˆ ρ(k0) and λ > λ∗.
Equation (12) is the zero expected proﬁt condition for period 0 lenders who face uncertainty
20about both the liquidity shock and the productivity shock. They know that if ρ > ˆ ρ(k0), the
project will not continue and they will get the scrap value. If ρ < ˆ ρ(k0) (i.e. there is no liquidation
in period 1) what they expect to get in period 2 depends on the productivity shock. Analogously
with the period 1 lenders’ zero proﬁt condition in equation (4), if output is not enough to cover






of output. If the proportion of
output that corresponds to period 1 lenders allows D1 to be repaid for output levels lower than
that required to cover total debts
 
i.e. D0 + D1

, then period 0 debt holders get output minus D1
until output is enough to pay also D0. When output is higher than this amount, they are repaid
in full.
Equation (13) is lenders’ zero proﬁt condition in period 1 for a given ρ, as analyzed above in
equation (4).

























































For simplicity, assume, from now on, that the scrap function is linear in the investment level;
i.e. S(k0) = sk0. Then, the optimal investment (and borrowing) level under equal footing, denoted
by ke




























∂k0 < 0; that is, the higher the level of investment, the lower the range of liquidity shocks
for which continuation in period 1 will be possible without senior lending. See the appendix for
the proof.
To set the optimal investment level borrowers balance the marginal beneﬁt, given by the mar-
ginal productivity of capital and by the eﬀect that one more unit invested has on the scrap value;
and the marginal costs, given by the cost of investing in period 0, the expected cost of reinvesting
in period 1 and the negative eﬀect that one more unit of investment has on the threshold value
ˆ ρ(k0). Since higher scrap values allow period 0 lenders to oﬀer better terms (see equation (12)),
the optimal level of investment increases in s.19
3.3.2 Senior lending in period 1







































where the superscript “s” implies that senior lending is allowed; and λB and λs are as deﬁned in
(10) and (8) above. ρs indicates the value of the liquidity shock above which there is no senior
lending. If the only criteria that senior lenders use to lend in period 1 is the nonnegativity of
expected proﬁts they would lend for all sizes of the liquidity shock implying that ρs will be equal
to one. However, we are allowing for the possibility that senior lender(s) have other criteria to
make their loans like maximizing borrowers’ welfare ex-ante. In this case, as will be shown below,
continuation of the project would not be optimal for high liquidity shocks and ρs would be less
19Analytically, this follows from applying the implicit function theorem to (17), taking into account that the second
order condition is satisﬁed.
22than one.
Equation (19) and equation (20) are the zero proﬁt conditions for period 0 and 1 respectively.
Period 0 lenders know that there will not be liquidation in period 1 and, consequently, they do
not consider the scrap value in their zero proﬁt condition. They know that senior lenders will have
priority on output and they will begin receiving repayment if and only if senior debts are totally
repaid. Equation (20) is the same as equation (9) above.
As before, integrating equation (20) over all possible values of ρ and adding this expression to
























0)dF(λ) in equation (18) and plugging equation (21) in the re-

















Optimal investment under seniority, denoted by ks
















The left hand side of (23) is the expected marginal return of investment, given by the expected
marginal productivity of capital times the probability of having senior lending in period 1 plus
the scrap value times the probability of liquidation. The right hand side is the marginal cost of
investment, given by the marginal cost of period 0 investment plus the expected reinvestment cost.










= 1 + E (ρ). (25)
233.3.3 Comparison
In this section we study how allowing for senior lending in period 1 aﬀects the level of welfare and
investment in period 0 (ex-ante). Since lenders set their prices in such a way that make zero proﬁts
in expectation, allowing senior lending in period 1 does not aﬀect their welfare ex-ante as long as
they are informed about the nature of future lending.
To have the benchmark case we introduce the solution of the social planner willing to maximize
borrowers’ welfare in period 0. It is socially optimal to continue with the project in period 1 when
the value of doing so is higher than the value of liquidating it getting the scrap value. This is when
E(λ)f(k0)−ρk0 ≥ sk0.20 The ﬁrst-best cutoﬀ value of the liquidity shock, above which it is socially





For liquidity shocks higher than ρ∗, continuation of the project will reduce its social value and
make borrowers ex-ante worse oﬀ. 21 Continuation of the project may not be optimal for high
scrap values.




Proof. When s = 0, ρ∗ in (26) is greater than one, otherwise investment does not take place
in period 0. Thus, it is socially optimal to continue for all sizes of the shock since the project has
no value in the case of liquidation. When s = 1 and
E(λ)f(k0)
k0 < 2, ρ∗ is less than one. Since ρ∗ is
continuous and decreasing in s and it is equal to one when s = 0 and less than one when s = 1, it
follows that there is only one value of s, called ¯ s above which liquidation is optimal for high enough
period-1 shocks.
A senior lender willing to maximize borrowers’ welfare ex-ante would not lend when the liquidity
shock and the scrap value are high enough, that is when ρ > ρ∗. However, if the senior lender(s) is
20A social planner chooses the level of investment and the cutoﬀ value of ρ in order to maximize borrowers’ welfare
in period 0. Analytically, this condition follows from maximizing an expression like (22) with respect to k0 and a
cutoﬀ value of the liquidity shock.
21The loss is borne by the borrowers because, as noted above, the lenders price their loans to make zero proﬁts in
expectation.
24willing to lend as long as they make nonnegative proﬁts there would be continuation of the project
in all cases even though this reduces the social value; thus having senior lending available for all
shocks is potentially suboptimal. This would be a reason why delegating senior lending to a single
lender or institution rather than to atomistic ones acting in a competitive environment would allow
to reach the ex-ante optimal solution. Atomistic lenders acting in a competitive environment would
automatically lend for all sizes of the liquidity shock.
Next we compare borrowers’ welfare under the two potentially suboptimal cases: equal footing
lending and when senior lender(s) lends for all sizes of the shock in period 1. Which scenario gives
the higher level of welfare depends on the size of the scrap value.
When s = 0, outcomes under seniority are ﬁrst best. Obviously, this means that, in this case,
welfare is higher under seniority than under equal footing. The higher is s the higher is the level of
welfare under equal footing,22 while the utility level under seniority does not depend on the scrap
value (since there is always continuation). When s = 1, we can express equation (16) as:
V0 = max
k0
E (λ)f(k0) − (1 + E(ρ))k0 −
Z 1
ˆ ρ(k0)
[E (λ)f(k0) − (1 + ρ)k0]dG(ρ). (27)
A comparison of (27) and (24) yields that the ex-ante utility level may be higher under the equal
footing scheme than under seniority. A suﬃcient condition to have this inequality is that ˆ ρ evaluated
at ks
0 (the level of investment that maximizes (22)) were less than one.23 This is because the
deﬁnition of ˆ ρ in (7) implies that the last term in (27) is negative. As a consequence, when
evaluating (27) at ks
0 we have that (27) is higher than (22). So, when evaluating (27) at the
optimal level of investment under equal footing (ke
0), the diﬀerence between (27) and (22) is even
higher. Since when s = 0, V0 < V s
0 ; ∂V0
∂s > 0 and V0 > V s
0 when s = 1, there is only one threshold
value of s such that for higher scrap values, equal footing yields a higher level of utility.
We can summarize this in the following proposition:
Proposition 4. If condition (5) holds when senior lending is allowed, there is some ˆ s < 1, such
that for s > ˆ s, welfare is higher under equal footing than in a case where senior lending is available
for all sizes of the liquidity shock.
22Analytically, follows from deriving (16) with respect to s applying the envelope theorem.
23This is the case if condition (5) holds also in the case of senior lending.
25To see how optimal investment is aﬀected in the case that senior lending is available for all
shocks, compare equation (17) and equation (25). First, assume that there is no scrap value in case
of liquidation (i.e. s = 0 in (17)). In this case, the term in brackets that multiplies
∂ˆ ρ
∂k0 in (17) is pos-
itive (otherwise there will be no investment in period 0), implying that
R 1
0 [E(λ)f0(ks
0) − ρ]dG(ρ) <
R ˆ ρ








Pr(ρ ≤ ˆ ρ)

< E(ρ/ρ > ˆ ρ)[1 − Pr(ρ < ˆ ρ)].
Since the ﬁrst term on the left hand side is greater than one (by (17)), while the ﬁrst term on the
right hand side is less than one by deﬁnition, it must be the case that f0(k0) > f0(ks
0) implying
that k0 < ks
0.
Note that in this model the expectation of senior lending does not make individuals take riskier
actions, so the increase in borrowing and lending in period 0 is not the consequence of moral hazard
but of avoiding ineﬃcient liquidation.
Now consider the case where the scrap value is diﬀerent from zero. As noted above, the scrap
value makes period 0 credit conditions under equal footing less onerous, because it represents a
positive payoﬀ in case of liquidation. From equation (17) we can see that the higher is s, the higher
the level of investment under equal footing. When s is equal to one, the term in brackets on the









Pr(ρ ≤ ˆ ρ)

> E(ρ/ρ > ˆ ρ)[1 − Pr(ρ < ˆ ρ)].
In this case we can not rule out the possibility of ks
0 being lower than k0.
Numerical exercise. We present a numerical example to show that for scrap values suﬃciently
high it is possible to have a lower level of investment and welfare when a senior lending is available
for all sizes of the liquidity shock. Consider the case where f(k0) = k0.8, λ is uniformly distributed
in [0,3], ρ is uniformly distributed in [0,1], and s = 1. In this case we obtain that V s
0 = 0.12 <
V0 = 0.15 and ks
0 = 0.32 < k0 = 0.59.
To conclude this section assume that borrowers are able to set institutions in period 0 that
26govern the availability of senior lending in period 1. In this case it would be optimal from an
ex-ante point of view to liquidate the project when the shock and the scrap value are high enough.
However, since borrowers always prefer continuation in period 1 there might be a conﬂict between
period 0 and period 1 incentives. From an ex-ante point of view borrowers may maximize utility by
committing not to allow senior lending in period 1 for high enough shocks. However, this promise is
not time consistent since, once initial lending decisions were taken and the shock occurs, borrowers
do have an incentive to allow for senior lending. Thus, in this case, a commitment device would be
needed to maintain the promise. Without this device, lenders will set their debt prices in period
0 knowing that senior lending would be available for all shocks in period 1 and the country would
be worse oﬀ. As noted above, in this case seniority may yield a lower level of welfare than that
obtained in an equal footing scheme. Of course, this time consistency problem does not exist if
continuation for all shocks is optimal ex-ante.
4 Conclusions
This paper presents a model that emphasizes the eﬀects of seniority in international ﬁnancial
markets on borrower countries and on creditors’ welfare. The model can be interpreted as referring
to atomistic senior lenders that act in a competitive market or to a senior lender that chooses to
make zero proﬁts in expectation despite its monopolistic situation (such as the IMF). However, the
interpretation of the IMF as the senior lender is supported by the preferred creditor status that
has shown in international capital markets.
We compare a situation under an equal footing scheme and one where senior lending is allowed.
We do this from an ex-post point of view, i.e. once the initial borrowing decisions have been taken
and from an ex-ante point of view, i.e. when the borrowing and investment decisions are taken.
Ex-post, a senior intervention always makes the borrower country better oﬀ since it provides
cheaper funds. However, existing lenders might be worse oﬀ with a senior intervention depending
on the size of the shock and what they expect to get in case of liquidation (the scrap value).
When the liquidity shock is small such that non-senior lending is available to cope with it, a senior
intervention makes existing lenders worse oﬀ since the project would continue anyway and senior
lending dilutes existing debt. When the shock is high enough such that non senior lending is not
27available a senior intervention might improve existing lenders’ situation depending on the size of
the scrap value. When the scrap value is small existing lenders would prefer continuation and a
senior intervention make them better oﬀ, while the opposite occurs when the scrap value is high.
The possibility of lenders being ex-post worse oﬀ with a senior intervention aﬀects the interest rate
they charge on their initial loans.
From an ex-ante point of view senior lender(s) could maximize borrowers’ welfare by lending
if and only if it is socially optimal to do so. This might imply that senior lending would not be
available when the shock and the scrap value are high enough. However, if the criteria that senior
lenders use to lend is the nonnegativity of their expected proﬁts, they would lend for all sizes of
the shock although this might reduce the social value of the project. In this case, senior lending
causes over-continuation of the project and initial lenders would charge a higher interest rate on
their initial loans. As a consequence initial lending could be lower when a senior intervention is
expected in the future which is contrary to the standard moral hazard critique that says that too
much rescuing in the future would lead to too much lending in the present. In this model we obtain
that too much rescuing in the future could lead to too little borrowing in the present.
In the real world coordination issues between lenders are likely to be important in international
markets. This might be a reason why it would be optimal to delegate senior lending in a single
institution rather to delegating it to atomistic lenders acting in competitive markets. These ones
are more likely to lend in all cases where the expected proﬁts are nonnegative.
However, even a single senior creditor might be tempted to lend ex-post even when it is not
optimal ex-ante. Since, once the initial borrowing decisions have been taken, borrowers always want
to continue with the project there might be a dynamic inconsistency problem when liquidation is
optimal from an ex-ante point of view. This single institution caring about borrowers welfare would
have incentives to make senior loans once the initial decisions have been taken. Thus credible and
clear rules are needed to reach the optimal outcome from an ex-ante point of view. Without these
devices period 0 lenders would anticipate senior lending in the future and leave the country with
lower welfare.
28A Proof of Lemma 1




















































































Taking into account that λ0 =
(1+ρ)D0
f(k0) and that λ∗ = D0+D1
f(k0) we have that the last two terms
are both equal to zero. Thus,
∂Q(.)









Proceeding in the same way we can show that this is also the case when λ1 < λ∗.
B Proof of Lemma 3
To simplify the exposition of this proof consider the special case when λ0 = λ1 = λ∗ . Without






















The proof proceeds by contradiction. Assume that r1=rs
1. This implies that Rs
1=R1 since
Ls



























































The second term of the right hand side is positive and the ﬁrst term is greater than the third
one under the assumption that rs
1 = r1. So the right hand side is unambiguously positive. So, the
left hand side should be positive and not zero as it is under our original assumption.
There is a contradiction.
Now we have to show that rs
1 cannot be greater than r1. Again we proceed by contradiction.
Assume rs
1 > r1, which implies that Rs
1 > R1. There are two possible cases: ˆ λ < λ∗ and ˆ λ > λ∗. In
the ﬁrst case the proof is the same as before. In the second case, split the integral limits as above,

















The second term of the right hand side is positive under our assumption that ˆ λ > λ∗. Con-
ditional on λ being greater than λ∗ and lower than ˆ λ output is greater than r1. This is because
output is higher than the necessary to totally repay the contractual interest rate r1 (i.e. λ > λ∗).
So, the left hand side is unambiguously positive and so should be the left hand side. But this
contradicts our initial assumption.We conclude that rs




From equation (7), deﬁne the function F(k0, ˆ ρ):
F(k0, ˆ ρ) ≡ ˆ ρ −
ˆ ρ





























































Since A is a concave function and B is a convex function (analogous to Lemma 1), this expression
















This expression will have the same sign as:
(1 + ˆ ρ) −
1













from the deﬁnition of ˆ ρ (equation (7)) we have that:
1
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